Trophy Wives and Momentum
I wonder how many of the thousand West Point graduates thought they got something useful out of this rant.
Defunding Science: Another Chapter in America’s National Suicide

The Economist, Trump’s attack on science is growing fiercer and more indiscriminate: It started as a crackdown on DEI. Now all types of research are being cancelled:
Scientists in America are used to being the best. The country is home to the world’s foremost universities, hosts the lion’s share of scientific Nobel laureates and has long been among the top producers of influential research papers. Generous funding helps keep the system running. Counting both taxpayer and industrial dollars, America spends more on research than any other country. The federal government doles out around $120bn a year, $50bn or so of which goes towards tens of thousands of grants and contracts for higher-education institutions, with the rest going to public research bodies.
Now, however, many of America’s top scientific minds are troubled. In the space of a few months the Trump administration has upended well-established ways of funding and conducting research. Actions with the stated goal of cutting costs and stamping out diversity, equity and inclusion (dei) initiatives are taking a toll on scientific endeavour. And such actions are broadening. On May 15th it emerged that the administration had cancelled grants made to Harvard University for research on everything from Arctic geochemistry to quantum physics, following a similar move against Columbia. The consequences of these cuts for America’s scientific prowess could be profound.
Under the current system, which was established soon after the second world war, researchers apply to receive federal funding from grant-making agencies, namely the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) as well as the Departments of Defence (DOD) and Energy (DOE). Once a proposal has been assessed by a panel of peers and approved by the agency, the agreed money is paid out for a set period.
This setup is facing tremendous upheaval. Since Mr Trump’s return to the White House, somewhere in the region of $8bn has been cancelled or withdrawn from scientists or their institutions, equivalent to nearly 16% of the yearly federal grant budget for higher education. A further $12.2bn was rescinded but has since been reinstated by courts. The NIH and the NSF have cancelled more than 3,000 already-approved grants, according to Grant Watch, a tracking website run by academics (see chart 1); an unknown number have been scrapped by the doe, the dod and others. Most cancellations have hit research that Mr Trump and his team do not like, including work that appears associated with dei and research on climate change, misinformation, covid-19 and vaccines. Other terminations have targeted work conducted at elite universities.
Much more is under threat. The president hopes to slash the NIH budget by 38%, or almost $18bn; cut the NSF budget by $4.7bn, more than 50%; and scrap nearly half of NASA’s Science Mission Directorate. All told, the proposed cuts to federal research agencies come to nearly $40bn. Many have already gone under the knife. In March the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS), which includes the NIH, announced it would scrap 20,000 jobs, or 25% of its workforce. According to news reports, about 1,300 jobs, or more than 10%, have been lost at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which carries out environmental and climate research. Staff cuts were reportedly also due to start at the NSF, but have been temporarily blocked by courts. To save more money, the NIH, the NSF, the DOE and the DOD have launched restrictive caps on so-called indirect grant costs, which help fund facilities and administration at universities. (These limits have also been partly blocked by courts.)
The administration says it has a plan. Mr Trump entered office on a mission to cut government waste, a problem from which the scientific establishment is not immune. On May 19th Michael Kratsios, his scientific adviser, stood up in front of the National Academies of Sciences and defended the administration’s vision. It wants to improve science by making it better and more efficient, he said—to “get more bang for America’s research bucks”. To do so, funding must better match the nation’s priorities, and researchers should be freed from groupthink, empowered to challenge each other more freely without fear of convention and dogma.
Shaking things up
He is right that science has a number of stubborn problems that can hardly be solved by a business-as-usual approach. Scientific papers are less disruptive and innovative than they used to be, and more money has not always translated into speedier progress. In the pharmaceutical sciences, new drug approvals have plateaued in recent years despite ever larger budgets. Researchers also spend much too long writing grant proposals and completing similar administrative tasks, which keeps them away from their laboratories.
Some of Mr Trump’s proposals are, in fact, overdue. Many NASA watchers, for example, would agree with his plan to find commercial alternatives for the Space Launch System, a giant rocket being built to take people to the Moon and beyond but which is years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget.
It would be hard, if not impossible, to improve the science funding system without some disruption. The problem, however, is that the administration’s cuts are broader and deeper than they first appear, and its methods more chaotic. Take the focus on dei, which the administration bemoans as a dangerous left-wing ideology. The agencies are targeting it because of an executive order banning them from supporting such work. But dei is notoriously ill-defined. Programmes that are being cancelled are not just inclusive education schemes, but also projects that focus on the health of at-risk groups.
Though it is mostly unclear why specific projects have been cancelled, Grant Watch keeps track of words that could have landed researchers in trouble. “Latinx”, for example, is a term for Hispanic people flagged as a telltale sign of DEI by Ted Cruz, a Republican senator. The NIH has cancelled a project on anal-cancer risk factors, the abstract of which uses the word Latinx. Another cancelled project concerns oral and throat cancer, for which gay men are at higher risk. Its abstract uses the phrase “sexual and gender minority”. There are many such examples.
Other cuts may do more damage. Some NIH-funded research on vaccines has been cancelled, as have $11bn-worth of special funds from the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for pandemic-related research. In March Ralph Baric, an epidemiologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who helped test the Moderna mrna vaccine for covid-19, had several vaccine grants terminated. One project aimed to develop broad-spectrum vaccines for the same family of viruses that sars-cov-2 comes from; scientists fear other strains might cross from animals to humans. Both the CDC and NIH justified such cuts by saying that the covid-19 pandemic is over. But this is short-sighted, argues Dr Baric, given the number of worrying viruses. “We’re in for multiple pandemics” in the future, he says. “I guess we’ll have to buy the drugs from the Chinese.”
Even for scientists who have not been affected by cuts, other changes have made conducting research more challenging. For example, the NIH and NSF have both delayed funding new grants. Jeremy Berg, a biophysicist at the University of Pittsburgh who is tracking the delay in grant approvals, wrote in his May report that the NIH has released about $2.9bn less funding since the start of the year, relative to 2023 and 2024. According to media reports, the NSF has stopped approving grants entirely until further notice.
At the NIH itself, the largest biomedical research centre in the country, lab supplies have become more difficult to procure. Department credit cards have been cut back and the administrative staff who would normally place orders and pay invoices have been fired. Scientists report shortages of reagents, lab animals and basic equipment like gloves. All these factors are destabilising for researchers—labs need a steady, predictable flow of cash and other resources to continue functioning.
If next year’s cuts to federal agencies are approved, more pain could be coming (see chart 2). The nsf’s budget cuts, for instance, will hit climate and clean energy research. And, according to leaked documents, the research arm of noaa would most probably cease to exist entirely. That would almost certainly mean defunding the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton University, “one of the best labs in the world for modelling the atmosphere”, says Adam Sobel, a professor at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. nasa’s Earth-observation satellites would likewise take a beating, potentially damaging the agency’s ability to keep track of wildfires, sea-level rises, surface-temperature trends and the health of Earth’s poles. Those effects would be felt by ordinary people both in America and abroad.
And as Mr Trump increasingly wields grant terminations as bludgeons against institutions he dislikes, even projects that his own administration might otherwise have found worthy of support are being cancelled. Take his feud with Columbia. His administration has accused the institution of inaction against antisemitism on campus after Hamas’s attack on October 7th 2023 and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza. On March 10th the nih announced on X that it had terminated more than 400 grants to Columbia on orders from the administration, as a bargaining chip to get the university to take action. Some $400m of funding has been withheld, despite Columbia having laid out what it is doing to deal with the administration’s concerns. Those grants include fundamental research on Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia and HIV—topics that a spokesperson confirmed to The Economist represent priority areas for the NIH.
Columbia is not alone. The administration is withholding $2.7bn from Harvard University, which has responded with a lawsuit. Within hours of Harvard refusing the administration’s demands, scientists at some of the university’s world-leading labs received stop-work orders. The administration has since said that Harvard will be awarded no more federal grants. Letters from the nih, the nsf, the dod and the doesent to Harvard around May 12th seem to cancel existing grants as well.
While it is too soon to say exactly how many grants are involved, 188 newly terminated nsf grants from Harvard appeared in the Grant Watch database on May 15th, touching all scientific disciplines. A leaked internal communication from Harvard Medical School, the highest-ranked in the country, says that nearly all its federal grants have been cancelled. Cornell University says it too has received 75 stop-work orders for dod-sponsored research on new materials, superconductors, robotics and satellites. The administration has also frozen over $1.7bn destined for Brown, Northwestern and Princeton universities and the University of Pennsylvania.
As these efforts intensify, scientists are hoping that Congress and the courts will step in to limit the damage. Swingeing as the budget plan is, the administration’s proposals are routinely modified by Congress. During Mr Trump’s first term, similar proposals to squeeze scientific agencies were dismissed by Congress and he might meet opposition again.
Susan Collins, the Republican chairwoman of the Senate appropriations committee, which is responsible for modifying the president’s budget, has expressed concern that Mr Trump’s cuts will hurt America’s competitiveness in biotech and yield ground to China. Katie Britt, a Trump loyalist and senator for Alabama, has spoken to Robert F. Kennedy junior, the health secretary, about the the need for research to continue. (The University of Alabama at Birmingham is among the top recipients of NIH money.) When on May 14th Mr Kennedy appeared before lawmakers to defend the restructuring of the HHS, Bill Cassidy, the Republican chairman of the Senate health committee, asked him to reassure Americans that the reforms “will make their lives easier, not harder”.
Courts will have their say as well. On May 5th 13 universities sued the administration over the NSF’s new indirect-cost cap, and the American Association of University Professors has likewise sued Mr Trump over his treatment of Harvard and Columbia. Harvard’s suit is ongoing. Dr Baric is one researcher who has had his grant terminations reversed in this manner. His state of North Carolina, alongside 22 other states and the District of Columbia, sued the HHS over the revoked CDC funding for vaccine research. On May 16th the court ruled that the federal government had overstepped and not followed due process, and ordered the HHS to reinstate the funding.
Reversing more cuts will take time, however. And the uncertainty and chaos in the short term could have lasting effects. A country where approved grants can be terminated before work is finished and appealing against decisions is difficult becomes a less attractive place to do science. Some researchers may consider moving abroad. American science has long seen itself as the world’s best; today it faces its gravest moment ever.
Legal Developments: A Fistful of Hot Takes

Walking Out the Door at Paul, Weiss
Four top litigation partners at Paul, Weiss have walked out the, together with their associates, their paralegals, their secretaries, and their book of business. In my experience, this sort of thing happens all the time at the big firms, even without cowardly deals capitulating to a would-be tinpot dictator. I wish I were persuaded that the walkout was over the Trump deal—and that it presages severe harm to the Cowardly Nine firm—but if wishes were horses, we’d all take a ride.
And if you don’t like my hot take on the matter, then ask perplexity.ai “Does the departure of four litigation partners at Paul Weiss mean anything?” Their AI chatbot’s opinion is quite different from mine.
How Many Federal Officials Can Trump Fire?
According to statutory law, a president cannot fire, without cause, a member of the National Labor Relations Board or of the Merit Systems Protection Board. Trump did it anyway. The lower courts told him to reinstate the two individuals, pending a final decision on the merits. Over the dissent of the three liberals, the rest of the court ordered that, until the case is decided on the merits, the two fired officials can stay fired.
The legal issues are a teense complex, and if you’re interested, check out this article from SCOTUSblog.
My hot take: A majority of the Supreme Court seems to be getting ready to shitcan a century of precedent, and to destroy the independent status of heretofore independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission.
What Else Happened to Team Trump in the Courts Last Week?
Nothing good for Trump. Harvard filed a new lawsuit against Team Trump, challenging the Administration’s refusal to allow any foreign students next year. The judge granted Harvard a preliminary injunction so fast that he barely had time to read the papers.
Another judge granted Jenner & Block’s request for a preliminary injunction against Trump. And a third judge ruled that Trump had acted illegally against the United States Institute of Peace.
A Reminder About a Fundamental Rule of Constitutional Law
Finally, Prof. Mitchell Berman of the University of Pennsylvania reminds us that No, Trump can’t force his agenda on U.S. entities. They have rights: The government cannot withhold benefits because it doesn’t like how people exercise their rights.
Eat It
Sleet Well Tonight: An Ignoramus and a Fool is in Charge of Homeland Security
N.Y. Times, Noem Incorrectly Defines Habeas Corpus as the President’s Right to Deport People:
At a Senate hearing, Senator Maggie Hassan, Democrat of New Hampshire, asked Ms. Noem about the issue. “Secretary Noem,” she asked, “what is habeas corpus?”
“Well,” Ms. Noem said, “habeas corpus is a constitutional right that the president has to be able to remove people from this country and suspend their right to—”
“No,” Ms. Hassan interjected. “Let me stop you, ma’am. Excuse me, that’s incorrect.”
Ms. Noem’s answer, which echoed the Trump administration’s expansive view of presidential power, flipped the legal right on its head, turning a constitutional shield against unlawful detention into broad presidential authority.
The Supreme Court and Temporary Protected Status
Amy Howe (scotusblog.com), Supreme Court allows Trump to end protected status for group of Venezuelan nationals
The headline—about yesterday’s short, unsigned Supreme Court order in Noem v. National TPS Alliance—is accurate but misleadingly incomplete.
Some people react to Trump-related Supreme Court decisions the way they react to baseball games. This season Team Trump was down 4 to 2 to Team Resistance, but yesterday Team Trump won, so now he’s only down 4 to 3.
If this is the way you think, then I have two pieces of advice: First, stop thinking this way, and try to figure out what’s actually going on in these court cases.
Second, if you reject my first piece of advice, then don’t count this as a Team Trump loss, because this particular game is far from over.
Hint: Only Justice Jackson disagreed with yesterday’s order. The other two liberals went along with it.
This is a clue.
Here is what the controversy appears to be about. Current law affords any President discretion—and listen up, I said “discretion”—to grant temporary protected status to immigrants who cannot safely return to their country. Recently, Team Trump exercised that discretion to pull protected status from several hundred thousand Venezuelans. Team Trump cited no evidence that conditions in Venezuela had changed for the better. Instead, their discretionary decision was based on factually unsupported bullshit about Tren de Aragua, etc., etc., etc., etc.
Now, what is a court supposed to do with this shambolic mess? Should it rule that a president lacks legal power to exercise lawful discretion if his reasoning is bullshit and arrant nonsense? Or is that approach a bridge too far in terms of constitutional separation of powers?
Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided to kick the can down the road for a mile or two. In July, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is going to hear the case “on the merits” (as we shysters say). And in the meanwhile, individual Venezuelans about to be deported are entitled to a judicial hearing. So observed the Supreme Court in passing.
I’m not a mind reader, but I assume that’s why Justices Kagan and Sotomayor went along with the majority.
So this particular game isn’t over—at least not yet. But I think that the interference-with-presidential-discretion argument may, in the end, carry the day. It’s always problematic to create a legal rule that says, “You are hereby forbidden to act like an asshole and a jerk.” The courts may deem in prudent to retreat to a rule that says “You are hereby forbidden to exercise legal authority that you clearly don’t have.”
And that would mean disaster for more than a million Venezuelans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans now residing in the United States–people whose lives may be shattered on the alter of judicial restraint.
The United States and China: Reflections on Prof. O’Neill’s Analysis

Relying on the fair use doctrine of copyright law, the immediately preceding post reproduces what, in my opinion, is an outstanding analysis of the nature of competition between China and the United States. Here are a few additional thoughts of my own.
They’re All Confucians
Throw a stone at the Politburo and you will not hit a Communist, you will instead hit a Confucian. That’s because they are all Confucians.
And what does it mean when I say that the Chinese political elite is uniformly Confucian? Mainly, it means two things. It means that the elite believes, down to the marrow of their bones, that the mass of common people—the lao bai xing—are morally and intellectually incapable of self-government.
The common people must be led. But by whom? By a moral and intellectual elite, who can guide society and government along the right path.
Confucianism became the state ideology of China in 136 BCE—the guiding framework for government, law, education, and social ethics. 2161 years later, Confucianism remains the state ideology of China.
These folks are never going to abandon Confucius and Mencius in favor of John Locke and James Madison. That’s not happening. And anyone who ever thought it was happening, or might happen, or would happen: that person does not know China.
Are You Saying, Then, That We Should Become Confucians, Too?
No, I’m not. But I am saying that our political elite and our economic elite badly needs to try to transform themselves into our intellectual and moral elite as well.
We need to be better Lockeans and Madisonians, and we need to draw our inspiration from Luke 12:48, remembering that where much is given, much is required.
And for the non-elites? They badly need to relearn how to be educated and responsible citizens of a democracy. And morally responsible folks among the elite need to do what they can to help. We could begin by restoring civics education to its rightful place in elementary and secondary schools.
Because if our political life keeps on consisting of performative nonsense, and if the American law bai xingkeep on getting their news from Russian propaganda they read on Facebook then Professor O’Neill tells us exactly where we are headed.
The United States and China: A Brilliant Analysis by a Retired CIA Executive and Current Georgia Tech Professor

Brian O’Neill (Atlanta Journal-Constitution), The China threat was always real. The American response never was: U.S. policy is reactive and performative, but China is disciplined, coordinated and strategically patient:
For decades, the United States engaged China less as it was and more as we imagined it could become. First as student, then partner and, eventually, reformer-in-waiting. We projected hopes of gradual liberalization — that exposure to global markets and Western institutions would, over time, turn China into a stakeholder in the U.S.-led order. In doing so, we cast ourselves as mentor and China as an ambitious apprentice.
It was our own geopolitical version of the Anakin Skywalker arc: We believed the student would follow the teacher’s path — until it became clear he had been blazing one of his own.
China was never waiting to be converted. It was never benign, and never blindly adversarial, either. It was a rising power studying the architecture of U.S. influence and quietly learning to apply the same tools: capital, leverage, alliances and time. The failure wasn’t that China changed. It’s that our assessment was always flawed.
We have not been outpaced by Beijing because it outmaneuvered us in some decisive moment. We’ve been falling behind for years — through bipartisan neglect, overreliance on market forces and the illusion that rhetorical consensus equaled strategic clarity.
Then-President Barack Obama bet on patient integration. President Donald Trump in his first term veered into impulsive confrontation. Neither built the foundation for enduring competition.
The Biden administration began to shift U.S. policy — reviving industrial policy through the CHIPS Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and targeted investments in supply chains and green technology. But it was cautious, fragile and poorly explained to the public. No enduring doctrine was built around it. No political infrastructure was assembled to protect it. As a result, the effort proved vulnerable — reversible with a change of administration. And under Trump, that reversal came fast.
Trump’s impulsively imposed tariffs — framed as a necessary reckoning with China but levied broadly against 57 trading partners — became the clearest symbol of America’s collapse of strategic direction.
China was hit hard, but the real exposure was our own: a reactive, chaotic policy disconnected from any coherent plan for competing with Beijing or sustaining global leadership.
China, by contrast, achieved what we never organized: alignment between ambition and execution. It mapped where the global economy was headed, subsidized the industries that would define it and embedded itself in the infrastructure of other nations’ development. We warned about dependence. China constructed it.
While we rehearse cliches about China’s long game, Beijing continues to make the cliché true — by matching ambition with execution.
Beijing doesn’t win by being perfect. It wins by being consistent. It declares a goal, funds it, adapts along the way and recalibrates its institutions to deliver. It doesn’t always succeed. But it has internalized a lesson we’ve discarded: Long-term strength is built through continuity, coordination and patience.
China can direct capital to a strategic sector without waiting for a committee markup. It can fund five-year initiatives to dominate electric vehicle manufacturing or become indispensable in solar panel supply chains. Its leadership doesn’t worry about a change in control of the legislature halfway through an investment cycle. It mandates. It finances. It builds.
We announce initiatives, hold press events and promise resilience — while designing policies that expire with the next election.
The danger isn’t just that this administration pursues a strategy of grievance instead of a strategy of victory; it’s that we have allowed our politics to unlearn how to build at all.
Our weakness lies not in a single leader or party, but in a political culture that treats governance as performance and strategic patience as surrender. If we continue on this path, it won’t be because China outsmarted us. It will be because we dismantled the architecture of American strength ourselves — and did so without even bothering to notice.
Some will argue this is uniquely Trumpian. It’s not. The inability to turn bipartisan agreement into coherent strategy predates him. His second term hasn’t caused the collapse; it has exposed how hollow the structure already was.
When it mattered, we didn’t rebuild manufacturing. We didn’t reinforce the global structures we had built. We didn’t finalize a trade alternative to Belt and Road — China’s massive program of building ports, railways, and infrastructure across Asia, Africa and beyond. Efforts such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership never developed into a credible economic counterweight.
We didn’t redefine what global leadership should mean once the liberal order began to stall. Instead, we kept reacting — and mistaking performance for resilience.
On May 12, Trump walked backed his most extreme tariffs — not as part of a strategic recalibration, but under pressure, in exchange for a 90-day cooling-off period. The announcement, hailed as a breakthrough, masks what it really is: a negotiated timeout between two governments whose underlying strategies remain unchanged. Beijing, steady and methodical. Washington, reactive and performative.
Even if some semblance of a stable trade deal is eventually secured, the damage to America’s economic statesmanship is done. The lost trust, the stalled investment cycles, and the strategic drift of the past decade have already left scars that won’t be easily reversed.
China, too, will suffer costs. But it is structured for recovery — disciplined, coordinated, strategically patient. The United States is not. When the dust settles, Beijing will still have a plan. We will still be arguing over who to blame.
If America wants to compete, it doesn’t need another round of punitive measures. It needs a memory of how it used to build — and a political class willing to stop setting fire to the scaffolding of national strength just to prove they were here.
We don’t need to become China. But we do need to stop sabotaging ourselves.
U.S. influence isn’t lost; but it will need to be earned back. After World War II, we led the reconstruction of devastated allies through the Marshall Plan — not only to rebuild Europe, but to cement a democratic order rooted in trust and shared purpose. Today, that trust has eroded. Restoring it will require a new kind of reconstruction — not of cities, but of alliances. We must show our partners that American leadership still values cooperation over coercion and is willing to share influence, not hoard it.
Rebuilding strength also requires letting go of magical thinking. Tariffs, slogans and industrial nostalgia won’t outcompete China. Long-term leverage demands reinvestment in education, manufacturing, energy and research — protected from partisan sabotage and “short-termism.”
And we must stop pretending this is a second Cold War. China is a rival, not a monolith. We will compete — often bitterly — but on AI governance, climate stability, trade norms and crisis response, the world cannot afford economic decoupling. Managed interdependence, rooted in verifiable standards and shared risk, is the only way to prevent lasting fracture.
Finally, both political parties must stop mistaking partisan theatrics for strategy. Democrats cannot wait for a favorable electoral map in 2026 or 2028. They must begin governing through influence now — by articulating serious proposals on industrial renewal, alliance repair and global standard-setting.
Republicans, meanwhile, must accept that tariffs and televised bravado are not strategy — they are delayed tactics. They must offer a governing framework, not culture war sound bites. Congress cannot reverse course alone, but it can reassert relevance and slow the damage.
The next president won’t shape the rivalry. They’ll inherit its terms. And if we continue on this path, China won’t need to defeat us. We’ll have finished the job ourselves.
Brian O’Neill is a retired CIA executive who has served in such leadership roles as deputy director of analysis at the National Counterterrorism Center and as executive editor of the President’s Daily Brief. He now teaches national security at Georgia Tech and contributes to the journal “Just Security” and other outlets.
At This Point, He’s Just Flinging Poo at the Walls

But if Walmart doesn’t pass on the tariffs, then China loses no sales because of the tariffs. And U.S. manufacturers who compete with Chinese-made goods gain no advantage from the tariffs.
The only thing that has happened is that Walmart owners suffer an economic loss. There is no economic loss to China or its exporters. And there is no enhanced incentive to “on-shore” American manufacturing. Which was the original stated goal of the tariffs.

